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The deterioration of food security since 2015 is a concerning reversal of decades-long progress towards reducing both the number of people and the percentage of the global popula-
tion that is undernourished1. This trend is particularly concerning 
in Africa, where the prevalence of hunger is highest and continues 
to increase1. Recent and ongoing food crises in sub-Saharan Africa 
demonstrate that among the many possible stresses, drought, vio-
lent conflict and locusts are three leading concerns2–4. In 2019 and 
2020, the largest desert locust outbreak in decades swarmed over 
East Africa, damaging hundreds of thousands of hectares of crop-
land and over a million hectares of pasture3. The locust outbreak 
exacerbated stress due to ongoing drought and violent conflict—
important factors in recent regional food crises. Maxwell and 
Hailey, for example, use hundreds of interviews to identify drought 
and conflict as the primary triggers of the two confirmed famines, 
one likely famine and two averted famines in Africa since 20104. 
Analyses of food-security crises that do not rise to the level of fam-
ines have likewise found drought and violent conflict to be central 
to recent food-security crises in Africa 5–13. The confluence of these 
three factors represents a grave challenge to food security.
Formulating an effective response, however, requires under-
standing the relative importance of each hazard in the context of 
different livelihood strategies. Here we analyse how pastoral, agro-
pastoral, agricultural and riverine or coastal livelihoods are exposed 
to and affected by drought, locusts and conflict in 14 of the most 
food-insecure countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Livelihoods are 
defined as the ways in which a population accesses food or income 
to purchase food. Using the lens of livelihoods allows us to differen-
tiate the effect of each hazard on different populations in a manner 
consistent with the practices of agencies tasked with responding to 
food crises14. We use the FEWS NET Integrated Food Security Phase 
Classification (IPC) levels to estimate the proportion of the popula-
tion in different levels of food insecurity. IPC levels are determined 
by food-security analysts according to a consensus-based approach 
that encompasses available information on food consumption, 
livelihoods, nutritional status, mortality, food availability, market 
prices and exposure to hazards15. FEWS NET uses livelihood-based 
household food economy analyses as the analytical framework for 
determining IPC levels, which makes using the FEWS livelihoods 
an internally consistent unit of analysis. We evaluate food-security 
crises using the four dimensions of magnitude (the number of peo-
ple affected), severity (IPC level), spatial coverage and duration of 
the resulting food crisis8. Our results provide insights that can better 
contextualize how food assistance needs have evolved differently in 
each livelihood zone in response to drought, conflict and locusts 
over the last decade.
Results
Food crises disaggregated by livelihood. The countries in this 
study include ~70% of the population affected by hunger in Africa 
as estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) from 
2009 to 20181 with similar temporal trends between hunger in 
Africa and crisis-level food insecurity (IPC level ≥3) in the studied 
countries (Fig. 1a). The prevalence of food insecurity was consis-
tently highest in pastoral livelihood zones, with multiple periods of 
crisis-level food insecurity affecting 40–50% of the pastoral popula-
tion. Agropastoral, agricultural and riverine or coastal livelihoods, 
on the other hand, tended to experience events in which crisis levels 
of food insecurity affected 10–15%, 5–10% and 2–4% of the popula-
tion in each livelihood zone, respectively (Fig. 1c–f). The prevalence 
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of crisis levels of food insecurity has increased across all livelihoods 
since 2014. To understand what causes food insecurity in each 
livelihood zone, we will analyse the hazards to which each zone is 
exposed and the response of food security to those hazards using 
the framework (exposure to a hazard) × (sensitivity) = (impact).
Sensitivity of livelihoods. Pastoralists not only experienced more 
frequent crisis levels of food insecurity compared with other liveli-
hoods, they were also exposed to substantially more variable hydro-
climate conditions, more frequent conflict and more frequently 
exposed to locusts (Fig. 2; P < 0.01 for all pairwise comparisons 
between pastoralist and other livelihoods using two-tailed t test). 
Pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods in nearly every country were 
associated with more variable hydroclimate (Figs. 1b and 2b) while 
increased levels of conflict tended to be in East Africa and locusts 
were most prevalent in the Sahel. More variable hydroclimate con-
ditions in pastoral areas probably indicates that these areas are 
unsuitable for purely sedentary agricultural livelihoods.
The relationship between food insecurity and drought or vio-
lent conflict differed by livelihood strategy (Fig. 3). Here we assess 
sensitivity to a hazard as the severity of food crisis that is associ-
ated with exposure to that hazard. More severe levels of food 
insecurity in pastoral and agropastoral zones were associated 
with drier conditions in the preceding year, while the relation-
ship in agricultural and riverine or coastal zones was less strong. 
Crisis levels of food insecurity in pastoral zones overwhelm-
ingly co-occurred with preceding dry conditions. These results 
agree with those of Coughlan de Perez et al., who demonstrate 
that droughts in East Africa affect pastoralists more strongly than 
non-pastoral livelihoods16.
Severe levels of food insecurity were associated with more fre-
quent conflict, most strongly in agricultural livelihood zones 
(Fig. 3g), followed by agropastoral and riverine or coastal zones. 
The relatively few instances of famine-level food insecurity 
occurred during times of both conflict and drought (Fig. 3 and 
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Fig. 1 | Food-insecure population by livelihood zone. a, Percentage of the population living in areas classified in each IPC level across all livelihood zones in 
countries included in the analysis; the blue line indicates the prevalence of hunger across all of Africa. b, Livelihood zones in the countries included in this 
analysis; uncoloured areas are excluded from further analysis. c–f, Percentage of the population living in areas classified in each IPC level in agricultural (c), 
agropastoral (d), pastoral (e) and riverine or coastal (f) livelihoods zones. Note the differing y axes in c–f.
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the presence of conflict can make populations more vulnerable to 
subsequent shocks, such as drought17.
Adult locusts were more frequently present during relatively 
food-secure years, even after accounting for their increased pres-
ence in non-drought years (Fig. 3 and Supplementary Fig. 1). This 
increased frequency may be a result of locusts seeking out healthy 
crops as a food source, but the lack of association with food secu-
rity implies that while extreme numbers of locusts may affect food 
security at a regional scale, they have not played a leading order role 
over the past decade. We used information on the presence of adult 
locusts in this analysis, but we tested the sensitivity of using locust 
swarms, of which there were considerably fewer observations, and 
found that they too were disproportionately present in pastoral areas 
(Supplementaty Fig. 2) and showed no relation to food-security 
status. We caution, however, that the intensity of locust swarms 
during the 2009–2018 period did not reach the intensity of the 
2019–2020 locust swarms, leaving open the possibility that locusts 
in extreme numbers may still affect regional-scale food security.
Characteristics of drought-related food crises. Differences in the 
relationship between food security and drought are not limited to 
the severity dimension of food crises. We find that, when exposed to 
droughts of a similar spatial extent and relative magnitude, a greater 
percentage of pastoralist area and population entered crisis levels of 
food insecurity compared to other livelihoods. In pastoralist areas 
~40% of the area and ~60% of the population reached crisis levels of 
food insecurity compared with 15–20% of both population and area 
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Fig. 2 | Prevalence of drought, locusts and conflict, by livelihood zone. a–f, Violin plots (shaded) showing the probability density functions of soil moisture 
coefficient of variation (a), frequency of conflict (c) and incidence of locusts (e) for different livelihood zones and the corresponding spatial plots (b,d,f). 
The inset boxplots in a,c,e show the interquartile spread in black and the median in white. g,h, IPC level distributions across livelihood zones (g) and 
plotted spatially (h). Coloured bars in g correspond to IPC 1 (minimal stress; light blue), IPC 2 (stressed; yellow), IPC 3 (crisis; orange), IPC 4 (emergency; 
red) and IPC 5 (famine; maroon).
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The time evolution of food insecurity differed substantially as 
well. Populations experiencing emergency levels of food crisis 
peaked later in pastoral livelihood zones than in agricultural live-
lihood zones; food insecurity persisted for longer in pastoral live-
lihood zones as well. It took 2 years from the onset of drought to 
return to pre-drought levels of food security in pastoralist regions, 
while in agricultural livelihood zones food security improved more 
quickly following the return of normal rains. This discrepancy was 
particularly visible in the associated crude death rates for each 
livelihood zone. In pastoral livelihood zones death rates gradually 
increased for about 9 months followed by a gradual decrease for 
12–15 months back to levels comparable to those at drought onset. 
In agricultural livelihood zones a sharp increase in the crude death 
rate for 3–6 months was immediately followed by an equally precip-
itous decrease, indicating a more severe hunger season than normal 
preceding harvest of the next crop. This suggests that at regional 
scales droughts do not generally disrupt planting a new crop 
substantially enough to trigger widespread food insecurity in agri-
cultural livelihood zones. Riverine or coastal livelihoods showed 
little increase in the crude death rate in response to drought.
Market prices of staple foods were likewise higher following 
droughts compared to the expected seasonality of food prices as 
illustrated by the subsequent non-drought years. While food price 
data at local markets were not dense enough to disaggregate by live-
lihood zone, Fig. 4 illustrates country-average prices for those coun-
tries containing each livelihood zone. Food prices peak coincident 
with the maximum extent of total precipitation and soil moisture 
deficits over the previous year. Crude death rates across livelihoods, 
which are derived from IPC data following Maxwell et al.8, similarly 
peak coincident with drought and market price peaks.
While we considered that observed relationships between 
drought and food security may be confounded by relations between 
drought and conflict, we found no systematic relation between 
drought and either the frequency of conflict or deaths related to 
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Fig. 3 | Sensitivity to drought, locusts and conflict, by livelihood zone. a–l, Distribution over the year prior to food-insecurity events (IPC levels 1–5) of soil 
moisture z scores (a–d), conflict frequency (e–h) and locusts (i–l) in pastoral (a,e,i), agropastoral (b,f,j), agricultural (c,g,k) and riverine or coastal (d,h,l) 
livelihood zones. Violin plots (shaded) in a–h depict probability density functions of drought and conflict, which are also depicted using the inset boxplots. 
Locust incidence boxplots in i–l show interquartile spread in black and median in white. Note the differing y axes.
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conflict (Supplementary Fig. 3). Conflict may be affected by envi-
ronmental stress in some cases but the relationship across Africa in 
recent decades is complex and context specific18–22.
Attributing food-security crises to drought and conflict. Food 
insecurity as measured by either population or spatial extent is con-
centrated in just a handful of countries, and coincides with inter-
mittent droughts and an increase in violent conflict (Fig. 5a,b). 
We note that these factors may coincide with economic contrac-
tions and price inflation which can further exacerbate food crises, 
which we discuss in the case of Nigeria and South Sudan. Across the 
study region, there is neither a trend towards drier soils (Fig. 5d) 
nor a trend in the percentage of the population affected by drought 
(Fig. 5c). Conflict, however, has become more frequent in nearly 
all locations, with the largest populations affected in Nigeria and 
Ethiopia. Both the extent of conflict and the percentage of the 
population affected by conflict are concentrated in Sudan, South 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Somalia (Fig. 5e,f). While expo-
sure to drought remained relatively constant, food-security crises 
trended downward until 2014, after which time they have been 
increasing (Fig. 5c,e). The early part of the record includes large 
food-insecure populations in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, fol-
lowed by a rise of food insecurity in Nigeria and South Sudan after 
2014 (Fig. 5a,b). The only statistically significant trends towards 
worsening food crises—those in northeast Nigeria and South 
Sudan—co-occurred with increases in violent conflict. But in 
other states, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Mali and Sudan, significant 
trends towards more frequent violent conflict were not associated 
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Fig. 4 | Food security crises during droughts in each livelihood zone. Evolution of the percentage of area in precipitation drought, soil moisture drought 
or vegetative stress, and the price of staple foods, the percentage of the population living in areas classified as in each IPC level, the percentage of area in 
each IPC level, and the crude death rate in pastoralist, agropastoralist, agricultural and riverine or coastal livelihoods from the onset of the drought (month 
0) to 2 years later (month 24).
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Fig. 5 | Distribution of hazards and trends in hazards by country. a,b, The prevalence of drought, conflict and crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC level 
≥3) in each country as measured as a percentage of total affected population (a) or area (b) over the entire study period. Six of the 14 countries are 
colour coded. c,e,g, Variation over time of the percentage of the total population across all study countries living in areas classified in crisis levels of food 
insecurity (c), drought (e) and conflict (g). d,f,h, Spatial distribution of the trend over 2009–2018 of the IPC level (d), soil moisture (f) and frequency of 
conflict in study countries (h), with insignificant (P > 0.05) trends hatched.
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Fig. 6 | Maximum covariance analysis mode 1 for Somalia. Spatial loading pattern of mode 1 on food-security variables and hazard variables. Mode 1 
in Somalia explains 46% of the covariance between food-security variables and hazard variables. a,b, Food-security variables include IPC level (a) and 
crude death rate (b). c–g, Hazard variables include soil moisture (c), precipitation (d), vegetation stress (e), the frequency of conflict (f) and the deaths 
attributable to conflict (g). h, Variance explained by mode 1 for each variable. CRD, crude death rate; SM, soil moisture. i, Time-expansion coefficients 
for mode 1. All units are standardized spatial loadings and time-expansion coefficients. See Methods for details. Somalia mode 1 is a mixed conflict and 
drought mode based on the spatial loading patterns and variance explained for each variable.
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with trends towards food insecurity (Fig. 5). These findings high-
light that while armed conflict is associated with negative effects 
on food security (Figs. 1 and 3), the effect can vary depending on 
the duration of the conflict and how it transforms local institutions 
and livelihoods 21–24.
To estimate the relative importance of drought or conflict in 
each country, we perform a maximum covariance analysis on a 
country-by-country basis (Methods), which identifies how spatial 
patterns in drought and conflict vary synchronously with spatial 
patterns in food security. Figure 6 illustrates an example for the first 
mode for Somalia. This mode attributes food insecurity to a com-
bination of drought and conflict. Protracted conflict and adverse 
economic conditions made the population of Somalia vulnerable 
to drought in the 2010–2011 and 2017 food crises, which dispro-
portionately affected minority and marginalized groups4,6–8,25,26. 
There is a spatial association of drought metrics (Fig. 6c–e) with 
food insecurity (Fig. 6a,b), such that both are most intense in south 
central Somalia. In central Somalia there is an association of food 
insecurity with increased conflict (Fig. 6f,g); in early 2011, for 
example, central Somalia was both the only area in a food crisis and 
the only area simultaneously experiencing drought and violent con-
flict. Elsewhere in Somalia drought is dominant. The time variation 
(Fig. 6i) describes drought-related food insecurity in 2010, 2011 
and 2017. The persistence of violent conflict during the drought 
in 2011 further contributed to the late and insufficient humani-
tarian response in some areas owing to operating restrictions 
imposed on relief agencies and the fear of food aid being diverted 
by Al-Shabaab6,7,26. The number of incidents of conflict in Somalia, 
however, actually peaked in 2013 and 2014 and was lower during 
both major droughts of 2010–2011 and 201725.
Drought in Ethiopia is the dominant contributor to African 
food insecurity in the 2009–2013 period, while conflict in South 
Sudan and Nigeria during the 2014–2018 period became increas-
ingly important (Figs. 5 and 7). Food-security crises in Ethiopia and 
Kenya were primarily triggered by drought—with droughts straining 
food systems in parts of Ethiopia nearly every year, including major 
events in 2009, 2011, 2015 and 20179,27,28. These droughts acted on 
populations made vulnerable by land fragmentation, lack of land 
tenure, lack of infrastructure, political marginalization and armed 
conflict9,10. In Nigeria, by contrast, violent conflict was the primary 
trigger of food-security crises (Fig. 7). The northeastern state of 
Borno is the epicentre of violent conflict related to Boko Haram, 
which has disrupted livelihoods, displaced people and reduced 
households’ ability to access food11–13, while resource-related con-
flict in the central northern part of Nigeria has led to increasingly 
frequent farmer–herder conflicts and cattle theft 13. Conflict fur-
thermore affected food prices after 2016 when oil pipeline sabotage 
in the Niger Delta reduced national oil production by over 50%29. In 
southern Sudan and South Sudan the recent increase in food insecu-
rity is attributable in part to a sustained increase in violent conflict 
and in part to erratic rains from 2017–20198,21,30. Armed conflict dis-
rupted food production directly, but also disrupted oil production, 
which led to a collapse of government revenue, an increase in cur-
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Fig. 7 | Food crisis attribution by livelihood zone. Attribution of the primary trigger of food insecurity for populations living in areas classified as being in 
crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC level ≥3; see text for discussion of triggers). a–e, Percentage of the population of all 14 study countries living in areas 
classified as IPC level ≥3 attributed to each trigger in total (a) and in each livelihood zone: pastoral (b), agropastoral (c), agricultural (d) and riverine or 
coastal (e). ‘Other’ indicates populations in food crisis not covered by the leading modes of the maximum covariance analysis in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, 
Nigeria or South Sudan. f, Population living in areas classified as IPC level ≥3 (crisis) as a percentage of total population in study countries over time.
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confirmed famines during this time period—South Sudan in 2017 
and Somalia in 2011—occurred in the presence of both drought and 
conflict (Supplementary Fig. 1).
Over the entire study period, drought became slightly less 
important as a source of food insecurity, while conflict became 
relatively more important (Fig. 7). The change was particularly pro-
nounced in agricultural livelihood zones due to the simultaneous 
increase in conflict-related food insecurity in Nigeria and South 
Sudan, and the decrease in drought-related food crises in Ethiopia. 
In pastoral and agropastoral zones a more modest relative rise in 
conflict-related food insecurity was attributable to the rise in violent 
conflict in South Sudan. Riverine and coastal zones are less affected 
by drought in general (Figs. 2–4), meaning that conflict is the lead-
ing trigger of food insecurity both before and after 2014 in these 
zones (Fig. 7)
Finally, we find that the character of food-security crises 
associated with drought and conflict are considerably different. 
Drought-related food-security crises were spatially widespread—
often occurring at a similar spatial scale as the drought itself 
(Fig. 4)—and tended to last 1–2 years (Fig. 7 and Supplementary 
Fig. 10). Conflict-related food-security crises were persistent, severe 
and had varying spatial scales (Figs. 5 and 6). The conflict-related 
crises in Nigeria and South Sudan were years-long, but were spa-
tially confined in the case of Nigeria to the northeast of the coun-
try while crises were more widespread in South Sudan (Fig. 5, and 
Supplementary Fig. 10). The years-long persistence of violence in 
South Sudan and Nigeria has been a major contributor to the post-
2014 increase in the prevalence of food crises across sub-Saharan 
Africa (Fig. 7).
Discussion
This study finds that the rise in food insecurity across sub-Saharan 
Africa that began in 2014 is attributable to violent conflict, par-
ticularly in South Sudan and Nigeria. Conflict-related food crises 
increased in relative importance compared to drought across all 
livelihood zones from 2009 to 2018. Drought was the primary trig-
ger of food-security crises prior to 2014, and remained important 
afterwards, but there has been neither an increased incidence of 
drought nor drought-related food crises during the period of rising 
food insecurity. We furthermore find that locusts had little associa-
tion with food crises in any livelihood zone from 2009 to 2018, but 
we caution that this finding is for a period with locust swarms that 
do not reach the intensity of the 2019–2020 swarm.
Assumptions and limitations. Our analysis should be understood 
as characterizing food-insecurity levels by livelihood and identify-
ing the primary triggers, or combinations of triggers, for specific 
food crises rather than providing a means of discriminating between 
plausible mechanisms linking triggers to levels of food insecurity. 
In Fig. 4, for example, we demonstrate that drought events cause 
relatively higher peaks in food prices than would otherwise be 
expected, but droughts could also affect food security by destroying 
livelihoods and causing the collapse of entitlements in the absence 
of food price changes. Likewise, we rely on detailed analyses of 
relevant food crises to identify the causal mechanisms linking vio-
lent conflict to food insecurity but do not attempt to generalize the 
importance of one mechanism over another.
Our analysis is furthermore limited by data availability. Owing 
to the paucity of detailed, longitudinal measurements of food 
insecurity and the imprecision of the IPC levels, our analysis is 
constrained to identifying causes of and trends in categoric classi-
fications of food insecurity at the synoptic scale. The IPC process 
was not designed for research purposes; it is complex, includes 
many different information streams and is carried out by differ-
ent teams to estimate the proportion of the population currently in 
various levels of food insecurity. The lack of detailed, spatially and 
temporally continuous information on food insecurity has become 
a major barrier to food-security research at a time when increas-
ingly detailed information is becoming available on the economic, 
abiotic, biotic and human hazards that affect food security. In this 
context, IPC levels represent a valuable source of information, but 
should not be considered a replacement for more frequent, pre-
cise measurements of food security that are still needed for many 
research purposes. Likewise, our estimates of crude death rate are 
conservative IPC-derived estimates, as in Maxwell et al.8, rather 
than direct observations, and do not replace the need for direct 
data collection as a means of improving food-security research 
and monitoring.
Implications of findings. Our results highlight the growing impor-
tance of violence as a trigger of food crises in all livelihood zones. 
Past work demonstrates that the pathways by which conflict con-
tributes to food crises include restricting operations of humani-
tarian organizations26, impeding the flow of information and 
food aid 6,7,26, disrupting livelihoods and households’ ability to 
access food 11–13, destroying infrastructure to disrupt regional eco-
nomic activity 29,31 and disrupting food production32. Further work 
is needed, however, to characterize the relative importance of each 
of these pathways and to identify means of predicting or monitoring 
these disruptions.
When considering relative differences among livelihoods, we 
find that those engaging in pastoral livelihoods, who account for 
over a quarter of the population in Africa33, substantially differed 
in both exposure and sensitivity to each hazard. Pastoralists were 
exposed to more variable hydroclimate conditions, exposed more 
frequently to locusts and tended to be less food secure than those 
living in agricultural livelihood zones. When exposed to droughts, 
pastoralists experienced more spatially widespread, severe and 
long-lived food-security crises that affect a greater fraction of the 
population compared with populations in agricultural livelihood 
zones. That pastoral regions require roughly twice as long to return 
to pre-drought levels of food security is particularly important 
because it demonstrates the magnitude of damage inflicted on pas-
toral livelihoods by drought.
Our findings demonstrate why actions taken to address pastoral-
ist food security during times of drought need to acknowledge the 
difference between agricultural and pastoral livelihood systems, as 
well as socioeconomic differences in access to resources. To survive 
droughts, herders often sell livestock to purchase food from local 
markets, delaying a deterioration of food security initially34. As a 
drought intensifies, the price of grain rises, animal health deterio-
rates, the livestock:grain terms of trade collapse and it becomes dif-
ficult for pastoralists to meet dietary needs34–36. Post-drought herd 
reconstitution can take multiple years, and is considerably more 
expensive than the associated post-drought costs in agricultural 
zones36–41. These short-term responses to drought are exacerbated 
by long-standing social and political differences between popula-
tions practising different livelihoods. The political exclusion of 
remote pastoral communities has led to a general lack of social ser-
vices, physical infrastructure and delays in government provision of 
food aid during food crises42–45.
One context in which our results may be useful is in improv-
ing food-security early warning systems. In particular, we provide 
evidence of how different hazards affect the food-security status 
of populations disaggregated by livelihood zones. Such informa-
tion is applicable, for example, to improving the FEWS NET sce-
nario development process36, which underpins food-security early 
warnings such as those recently issued for East Africa at the time 
of writing46. While our results cannot provide details on the effect 
of droughts or conflict on the income or assets of households, it 
can provide an indication of the food-security outcomes up to 24 
months post-hazard in different livelihood zones. The persistence of 
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food insecurity in pastoral livelihoods for 2 years post-drought, for 
example, may be useful when determining whether droughts from 
12–24 months ago should be considered in the problem specifica-
tion step of the household economy analysis framework. Because 
FEWS NET food-security forecasts are less accurate in pastoral than 
in agricultural livelihood zones5, there is an opportunity to improve 
future forecasts of pastoral food insecurity. To move beyond more 
accurate food-security forecasts towards improving the services that 
can mitigate or prevent food crises in pastoral regions will require 
a combination of approaches, including improving precipitation 
predictions at time scales relevant for pastoral decision-making, 
providing economic and technical support during crises, improving 
pasture and water point management and monitoring, strengthen-
ing investment in water infrastructure in pastoral communities and 
along transhumance corridors, and promoting fodder cultivation 
and conservation along with grain storage not only among pastoral-
ists and agropastoralists but also among agriculturalists on whom 
pastoralists rely to purchase fodder and grains.
Methods
Data. All data sources are described in Table 1. We use monthly soil moisture 
estimates from the Global Land Evaporation Amsterdam Model (GLEAM) 
v.3.2a (1981–2018), which uses satellite-observed surface (0–10 cm) soil 
moisture, vegetation optical depth, reanalysis air temperatures and a multisource 
precipitation product to derive surface soil moisture values at 0.25° resolution 
47. Monthly precipitation data come from the Climate Hazards group Infrared 
Precipitation with Stations (CHIRPS; 1981–2018) aggregated to 0.25° (ref. 48). 
Vegetation data come from the MODIS satellite MOD13A1 V6 product generated 
every 16 d at 500 m spatial resolution since the year 200049. We use the Enhanced 
Vegetation Index (EVI), which mitigates canopy background variations and 
maintains sensitivity in dense vegetation. The values are atmospherically corrected 
and masked for water, clouds, heavy aerosols and cloud shadows. The data are 
temporally averaged at the monthly level using Google Earth Engine, and then 
spatially averaged into a 0.5° grid. Precipitation, soil moisture and EVI were all 
averaged over the previous 12 months before standardizing values as z scores across 
years. The mean and standard deviation used in the z score for a precipitation value 
in April, for example, was calculated using the May–April average for all years.
Estimates of food insecurity in this analysis are reported to be compatible 
with the IPC scale, which provides protocols to measure the severity of acute 
food insecurity using a five-point scale: minimal food insecurity, stressed, 
emergency, crisis and famine (phases 1–5, respectively). The protocols and scale 
are designed to be applicable across countries. IPC levels are determined by 
consensus among analysts using all available information, including information 
on food consumption, changes to livelihood strategies, nutritional status, mortality, 
food availability, market prices and exposure to hazards15. IPC measurements, 
therefore, are not entirely independent from measures of drought or conflict, but 
they do represent a convergence of evidence beyond exposure to these hazards 
and represent a consensus-based synthesis of the best available information. IPC 
data have become prominent in the international community, used operationally 
by donors, international aid agencies and the United Nations as a means of 
determining food assistance needs and for formulating humanitarian response 
plans50,51. IPC data provide estimates of food security at the subnational level every 
three months from 2009 to 2016 and every four months from 2016 to present 
for countries in West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. Determining the 
true resolution of the IPC data, however, is difficult because analysts may use 
information from fine spatial scales to infer the food-security status of populations 
at larger spatial scales. IPC-compatible data are downloaded from the FEWS NET 
website and converted to a regular grid of 0.1°, 0.25° or 0.5°.
We adopt the livelihood zones from FEWS NET as one unit of analysis. FEWS 
NET produces maps of livelihood zones within each country, based on geographic 
and climatic zones, and where people generally have similar options for obtaining 
food, income and market access. These detailed maps are produced using a 
combination of expert and stakeholder input and Household Economic Analysis 
information. These livelihood zone maps are maintained by FEWS NET and are 
publicly available as shapefiles for geographic information systems applications 
(https://fews.net/sectors-topics/sectors/livelihoods). We use these shapefiles to 
derive simplified livelihood zones by aggregating the more detailed zones into the 
following classifications: coastal or riverine, pastoral, agropastoral, agricultural or 
urban. Note that we do not analyse urban livelihood zones here due to their limited 
extent. For all data processed using administrative units, we use the FEWS NET 
administrative level 1 and 2 shapefiles.
Data on the incidence of locusts are from the FAO Locust Hub (https://
locust-hub-hqfao.hub.arcgis.com/) for 2009–2018. Data are available only at annual 
resolution prior to 2012, so we use annual resolution data in this analysis. For IPC 
data reported in January and February, locust incidence from the previous year 
is used; for those data reported in April, June or July, the average of the current 
year and the previous year is used; and for IPC data reported in October, the 
current year is used. We count incidence of events in which locusts were detected, 
‘LOCPRESENT’=1 in the data, in each administrative unit level 1 per year.
For information on conflict in Africa we use the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Data (ACLED)52. We use metrics of deaths or frequency of events occurring 
in the previous 12 months within a given administrative level 1 unit for all events 
in the battles, explosions/remote violence, riots or violence against civilians event 
categories. We choose administrative units because violent conflict in a location is 
likely to have knock-on effects that influence food access22 by affecting institutions 
or infrastructure. We tested the sensitivity of the analysis to the area of aggregation, 
using the intersection of administrative unit 2 and livelihood zones, and found 
the results to be similar. Similar to hydroclimate and vegetation variables, we sum 
deaths from conflict or frequency of conflict events over the preceding 12 months 
at each time step.
Food prices are from the FAO’s GIEWS Food Prices Monitoring and Analysis 
(FPMA), which tracks monthly wholesale and retail prices at the crop and 
city-market level. We use standardized US-dollar-equivalent crop prices for maize, 
rice, wheat, cassava/gari, millet and sorghum. Missing monthly prices are linearly 
interpolated, and prices are normalized to the 2015 average. A country-level staple 
index is weighted by FAO country-level caloric dependence according to FAO 
Food Balance Sheets averaged over the 2000–2013 period for each crop and the 
crop’s caloric content (NutVal 4.1). The 2000–2013 period was used to calculate 
average caloric dependency ratios due to data availability. Note that because price 
data are not available for all staple crops in every country, each country’s index 
consists of the crops available in its city-markets.
We use the WorldPop database for annual, gridded population data (https://
www.worldpop.org/). WorldPop disaggregates census-level data to a regular 
grid using statistical models that incorporate survey, satellite and cellphone 
data53. Using a modelling approach to disaggregate data avoids the problem of 
overestimating population in sparsely populated rural areas54. WorldPop data is 
aggregated up to a 0.1° grid to match the IPC data.
We derive conservative estimates of the crude death rate related to food 
insecurity following Maxwell et al.8 by combining information from the IPC data 
with population data. Each IPC phase includes thresholds for indicators of food 
consumption, changes in livelihoods, acute malnutrition prevalence and crude 
death rate, measured as the number of people dying per day per 10,000 people. 
The most conservative estimate of mortality associated with each IPC phase50 is 
multiplied by the population in that phase to derive a conservative estimate of 
Table 1 | Data sources for all variables used in the analysis
Variable Dataset Source
Precipitation Climate Hazards group Infrared Precipitation with Stations 
(CHIRPS)
https://www.chc.ucsb.edu/data/chirps
Soil moisture Global Land Evaporation Amsterdam Model (GLEAM) v.3.2a https://www.gleam.eu/
Vegetation stress Enhanced Vegetation Index from the Moderate Resolution 
Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS)
https://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/data/dataprod/mod13.php
Locust presence FAO Locust Hub https://locust-hub-hqfao.hub.arcgis.com/
Armed conflict Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard
Livelihood zones Famine Early Warning System Network https://fews.net/data
IPC level Famine Early Warning System Network https://fews.net/data
Food prices FAO Food Prices Monitoring and Analysis https://fpma.apps.fao.org/giews/food-prices/tool/public/#/home
Population WorldPop gridded population data https://www.worldpop.org/
NATuRE FooD | www.nature.com/natfood
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved
ArticlesNature Food
crude death rate. This estimate of crude death rate is probably conservative and 
may not accurately represent actual mortality during events for this reason, but is 
useful as a means of comparing death rates across time and between events8. For 
example, IPC phase 3 is associated with a crude death rate range of 0.5–1 person 
per 10,000 people per day, so the lower threshold of 0.5 is used. For IPC phases 4 
and 5, the lower thresholds of 1 and 2 people per 10,000 people per day  
are used, respectively.
We define the analysis units used in the sensitivity and vulnerability analyses as 
the unique combination of livelihood zones and administrative level 2 units, which 
we create in ArcGIS by intersecting the two shapefiles and which will be referred to 
as analysis units hereafter. We use the FEWS NET administrative boundaries and 
livelihood zone boundaries to define these boundaries. We calculate the average 
precipitation, soil moisture or EVI anomaly at each time step within each analysis 
unit. We link the analysis unit to the appropriate administrative level 1 unit, as 
well as the associated conflict and locust exposures. FEWS NET IPC-compatible 
data on food security are reported at the livelihood zone or administrative unit, 
although there are considerable differences between the spatial resolution of 
reporting between countries. We chose the combination of administrative level 
2 and livelihood zone as a compromise between the finest-scale data available in 
Ethiopia, for example, where data are reported at the Woreda level (administrative 
level 3), and more coarse reporting units such as Somalia, where food-security data 
are reported by livelihood zone.
Analysis. Food-security crises are dynamic phenomena with dimensions of 
magnitude, severity, spatial coverage and duration8. Even after the famine 
declaration many of the deaths occurred outside of the areas declared to be in 
famine. Consider, for example, the famine in Unity State, South Sudan; in 2017 
famine conditions disappeared from the state but the number of people affected 
by food insecurity increased (for example, the severity of the crisis decreased 
while the magnitude increased)8. Consider also the 2010–2012 food-security 
crisis in Somalia, in which the majority of the excess mortality occurred either 
before famine conditions were declared or outside of the famine-affected regions, 
highlighting the importance of understanding spatial coverage and duration 
of a crisis in addition to severity8. Studying only the factors that affected the 
maximum severity of food insecurity in either of these examples provides at best 
an incomplete understanding of the crisis. In our analysis we characterize not only 
the severity of food-security crises by livelihood, but also the spatial coverage, 
magnitude and duration. Here we study a selection of the most food-insecure 
countries in Africa, meaning that by design the countries included in our analysis 
have a higher sensitivity to shocks than would many countries.
To analyse the prevalence of drought, conflict and locusts, in each livelihood 
zone we aggregate each variable over the analysis units, which are the unique 
combination of livelihood zones and administrative level 2 units. We calculate the 
soil moisture anomaly over the previous year, frequency of conflict over the previous 
year, frequency of adult locusts over the previous year and mode IPC value for each 
analysis unit at each time step. We next convert soil moisture values into measures 
of the coefficient of variation by dividing the standard deviation by the mean soil 
moisture value at the analysis unit level. We plot the distribution of each variable as 
a function of livelihood zone associated with the analysis unit in Fig. 2. Note that the 
soil moisture coefficients of variation are evaluated over the whole time period to 
provide one value per location and the distributions shown in Fig. 2 are over these 
values. In contrast, the IPC level is for a given month and year, as are the conflict 
frequency and frequency of locusts during the year prior. The distributions of IPC 
level, locusts and conflict in Fig. 2 are therefore across space and time.
To analyse the relation between the severity of food insecurity—as measured 
by the IPC phase—and drought, conflict or locusts, we plot distributions of each 
variable at the spatial scale of the analysis unit disaggregated by livelihood zone 
and IPC level (Fig. 3). The soil moisture distributions here are not the coefficients 
of variation as in Fig. 2, but instead the standardized z scores of soil moisture over 
the year prior to the IPC observation. The frequency of locusts and conflict are 
likewise aggregated over the year prior to the IPC observation, although note that 
the time resolution of the locust data makes the time dimension inexact (Data).
To analyse the evolution of food-security status during droughts, we use an 
event composite analysis. We first identify all drought-related food-security crises 
by selecting each month in which the IPC scale indicated emergency, crisis or 
famine conditions present in a country that occurred concurrently with deficit 
precipitation over the previous year. Because we are interested in the multiyear 
evolution of these events, we identify the onset of the food insecurity and drought—
again, as measured using precipitation over the previous year—as the starting 
month and 24 months later as the end month. The start of events often coincided 
with the onset of the hunger season in which there were inadequate seasonal rains. 
We do not allow for overlapping events as this would double-count events in the 
composite. In the event of consecutive years of drought food-security crises, we 
choose the second year of the multiyear event. We use the national scale as the 
spatial scale for events because the food-security outcomes related to a drought 
depend on the economic and political response of social and political institutions.
There may be multiple food-insecurity events, therefore, relating to a 
single mesoscale drought. There are three events, for example, that relate to 
the 2011 failure of the long rains in the Horn of Africa because the drought 
affected Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya27. Using this procedure, we identify 
32 drought-related food-security events. By averaging all drought-related 
food-security crises from each country together, we isolate the influence of drought 
on food security while treating the effects of conflict as a random variable that 
averages out. This approach is supported by the lack of any discernible relationship 
between drought and conflict in the drought composite.
To attribute changes in food-security status to drought and conflict, we 
conducted a maximum covariance analysis (MCA). MCA is a methodology that 
identifies the patterns in two space-time datasets that explain the maximum 
covariance between them. Here we work with matrices that describe food security 
in space and time, F, and matrices that describe the hazards, H, that drive food 
insecurity. To construct F and H we first resample the soil moisture, precipitation, 
crude death rate and IPC data to a 0.5° grid to match the EVI and conflict data 
resolution. We then construct the N × M food-security indicator matrix, F, where 
N is the number of observations in space and M the number of time steps, which 
are every 3–4 months (Data), by concatenating observations from gridded IPC 
data with observations from gridded estimates of the crude death rate. Next, 
we similarly constructed the N × M hazard matrix, H, where N is the number 
of observations in space and M the number of time steps, by concatenating 
precipitation anomalies, soil moisture anomalies, EVI anomalies, estimates of 
conflict frequency and estimates of deaths from conflict. Conflict and crude 
death rate data were log-transformed then de-meaned, food-security indicators 
were de-meaned and climate data were standardized before calculating the 
cross-covariance matrix used in the maximum covariance analysis. We conducted 
the analysis separately for each country by masking out all areas outside of the 
given country. We chose the country scale because while the incidence of violent 
conflict and drought crosses borders, the infrastructure, institutions and policies 
that determine food-security outcomes will depend on individual countries, 
which makes the country scale a natural domain for the analysis. After conducting 
the analysis for each country, we retained only the leading modes that were well 
separated from other modes based on their eigenvalues (not shown). We determine 
the spatial patterns of covariance between food security and hazard, namely:
FHT = UΣVT
where FHT is the cross-covariance matrix. The orthonormal matrices U and V then 
contain the spatial singular value decomposition modes corresponding to the data 
fields F and H, respectively. Σ is a matrix with the singular values on the diagonal. 
The leading modes represent the primary patterns of covariance between the two 
fields. We next recover the time-expansion coefficients for each mode, k, as:
Ak = UTk F
Bk = VTkH
such that we can reconstruct the portion of the total variance in the data related to 
each singular value decomposition mode as
Fk = AkUk
Hk = BkVk
The maximum covariance analysis provides a series of spatial patterns (U and 
V) of the stresses to which food systems are subject (variations in precipitation, soil 
moisture, vegetative stress, conflict frequency and conflict intensity—contained 
within V) and the associated spatial pattern of the response of food-security 
indicators (variations in the IPC level or associated crude death rate—contained 
within U). A spatial pattern of widespread drought and vegetative stress, for 
example, coincides with degraded food security in the same region in the second 
MCA mode calculated for Ethiopia (Supplementary Fig. 4).
The eigenvalues of the MCA indicate the covariance between the hazard 
variables matrix, H, and the food-security variables matrix, F, explained by each 
mode. The extent to which each mode explains the variance of the individual 
variables within each matrix can be calculated by comparing the variance of the 
reconstruction using each mode to the total variance of the field (for example, by 
comparing the field reconstructed from mode k, Fk, to the total variance of the 
original field F).
The separable, leading modes are categorized as drought-related or 
conflict-related modes based on pattern loadings, time-expansion coefficients and 
variance explained in the conflict covariates (conflict-related deaths and frequency 
of conflict) or the physical climate variables (precipitation, soil moisture and EVI). 
Before attributing any mode to being related to either physical variables or conflict, 
we reference external literature to cross-check the associations in the maximum 
covariance analysis. Our attribution for each mode used in Fig. 6 is shown below.
In Ethiopia the first two modes were well separated from the remaining 
modes, with both modes loading heavily on physical variables and less strongly 
on conflict-related variables (Supplementary Figs. 4 and 5). The first mode 
describes increased precipitation, wet soils, little vegetative stress and relatively 
food-secure conditions in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The second mode 
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describes widespread drought and vegetative stress in the northwest of Ethiopia, 
which coincides with food-insecure conditions in the same regions. Both of these 
first two modes were labelled to be primarily physical climate-related modes. That 
recent food-security crises in Ethiopia are predominantly attributable to drought 
is supported by the interview-based analysis of Maxwell and Hailey4, which found 
the 2011 food-security crisis to be drought driven and the 2015–2018 crisis to 
be largely attributable to drought, although they note that localized conflict may 
be a contributing factor in the latter case. Drought, in fact, affected food security 
in some portion of Ethiopia nearly every year between 2009 and 2018, including 
major events in 2009, 2011, 2015 and 20179,27,28.
In Somalia we retain only the first mode, which loads on both conflict-related 
variables and on physical climate-related variables (Fig. 6). This mode loads 
primarily on the confirmed 2011 famine and the averted 2017 famine, which 
Maxwell and Hailey attribute to both drought and conflict4. Maxwell and Majid 
outline the ways that violent conflict delayed the government and humanitarian 
response to the drought in 2011, which allowed food security to deteriorate 
considerably before intervention26. This mode is further discussed in the main text.
In Kenya the first mode is retained and corresponds to wet growing conditions, 
with little vegetative stress that corresponds to food-secure conditions throughout 
the country (Supplementary Fig. 6). This mode was labelled as a physical climate 
mode. Maxwell and Hailey confirm that recent food insecurity in Kenya was 
mostly affected by drought4.
In Nigeria we retain only the first mode, which describes a deterioration 
of food security in the northeast coincident with significant increases in the 
frequency of conflict (Fig. 5 and Supplementary Fig 7). While this mode loads 
also on insignificant trends towards dry conditions in Nigeria, the relatively drier 
conditions do not correspond in space to significant changes in food-security 
status, while the spatial loadings on conflict-related variables and changes in 
food-security status occurred simultaneously in the northeast. This mode describes 
the rise of Boko-Haram-related violence centred in the northeast state of Borno in 
Nigeria that has disrupted livelihoods, displaced people and reduced households’ 
ability to access food, which led to persistent food insecurity including a possible, 
but unconfirmed, famine11–13. We furthermore see a sharp increase in food price 
inflation in Nigeria in 2016 (results not shown) related to conflict and oil pipeline 
sabotage in the Niger Delta, which reduced national oil production by over 50%29. 
Reduced government revenue, already low due to the drop in global oil price, 
contributed to a recession in 2016 and a major currency devaluation, which 
produced high domestic inflation
In Sudan and South Sudan we retain two modes of variability, which are both 
separable from the remaining modes. The first mode describes wet conditions 
coincident with little vegetative stress, but an increased frequency of conflict across 
the domain that coincides with higher rates of food insecurity. This mode describes 
the statistically significant increase in conflict and decrease in food security over 
the domain (Fig. 5 and Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9). We therefore attribute this 
mode to be primarily conflict-related. The second mode describes widespread 
precipitation deficits, dry soils and vegetation stress, with soil moisture drought 
particularly severe in South Sudan. This mode loads heavily on the droughts of 
2010 and 2017, which, in combination with conflict during 2017–2019, led to food 
insecurity in the region8,21,30. The conflict in South Sudan affected food security 
directly, but also reduced economic activity by disrupting oil production31.
We used the attributed, reconstructed, IPC variable from the MCA modes for 
Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia to estimate the relative 
importance of each trigger in each livelihood zone. We sum the population in areas 
with reconstructed IPC levels that reach crisis levels (IPC level ≥3). In South Sudan, 
where two modes are used for different triggers, we first attribute based on the 
reconstruction using the conflict mode (mode 1, Supplementary Fig. 8) followed by 
the inclusion of the conflict and drought mixed mode (mode 2, Supplementary Fig. 
9). Food insecurity in all other countries and for all other triggers not included in 
the attribution analysis (for example, flooding, micro- and macro-economic shocks) 
were categorized as ‘other’. The bar charts in Fig. 7 for each livelihood are calculated 
by summing the populations living in areas classified in crisis levels of food insecurity 
attributed to each trigger over the stated time period and converting to a percentage 
based on the total population living in areas classified in crisis levels of food insecurity.
Statistics. We analyse statistical significance of differences in prevalence of 
hazards using pairwise comparisons between the pastoral distributions and each 
other livelihood zone using a two-tailed Student’s t test. For exposure to drought 
compared to other livelihoods, P = 0.0 for all pairwise comparisons, with the 
number of observations as follows: pastoralist, n = 10,202; agropastoral, n = 40,768; 
agricultural, n = 50,361; coastal or riverine, n = 6,965. For exposure to conflict 
compared with other livelihoods, P < 1 × 10−7 for all pairwise comparisons, with the 
number of observations as follows: pastoralist, n = 7,168; agropastoral, n = 22,7663; 
agricultural, n = 34,933; coastal or riverine, n = 5,325. For exposure to locusts 
compared with other livelihoods, P = 0.0 for all pairwise comparisons, with the 
number of observations as follows: pastoralist, n = 10,021; agropastoral, n = 40,041; 
agricultural, n = 50,425; coastal or riverine, n = 7,091.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the 
Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All data used as part of this research are publicly available from the sources listed 
in Table 1.
Code availability
All code available upon request.
Received: 6 November 2020; Accepted: 16 June 2021;  
Published: xx xx xxxx
References
 1. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019: Safeguarding 
Against Economic Slowdowns and Downturns (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, 
WHO, 2019).
 2. Salih, A. A., Baraibar, M., Mwangi, K. K. & Artan, G. Climate change and 
locust outbreak in East Africa. Nat. Clim. Change 10, 584–585 (2020).
 3. Impact of Desert Locust Infestation on Household Livelihoods and Food 
Security in Ethiopia (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2020).
 4. Maxwell, D. & Hailey, P. The Politics of Information and Analysis in Famines 
and Extreme Emergencies: Synthesis of Findings from Six Case Studies 
(Feinstein International Center, 2020).
 5. Krishnamurthy, P. K., Choularton, R. J. & Kareiva, P. Dealing with 
uncertainty in famine predictions: how complex events affect food security 
early warning skill in the greater Horn of Africa. Glob. Food Sec. 26,  
100374 (2020).
 6. Majid, N. & McDowell, S. Hidden dimensions of the Somalia famine. Glob. 
Food Sec. 1, 36–42 (2012).
 7. Maxwell, D., Majid, N., Adan, G., Abdirahman, K. & Kim, J. J. Facing famine: 
Somali experiences in the famine of 2011. Food Policy 65, 63–73 (2016).
 8. Maxwell, D., Khalif, A., Hailey, P. & Checchi, F. Determining famine: 
multi-dimensional analysis for the twenty-first century. Food Policy 92,  
1–13 (2020).
 9. Mohamed, A. A. Food security situation in Ethiopia: a review study. 
 Int. J. Health Econ. Policy 2, 86–96 (2017).
 10. Devereux, S. Food Insecurity in Ethiopia (Institute for Development  
Studies, 2000).
 11. Ayinde, I. A., Otekunrin, O. A., Akinbode, S. O. & Otekunrin, O. A. Food 
security in Nigeria: impetus for growth and development. J. Agric. Econ. 6, 
800–813 (2020).
 12. Otekunrin, O. A., Otekunrin, O. A., Momoh, S. & Ayinde, I. A. How far has 
Africa gone in achieving the zero hunger target? Evidence from Nigeria. Glob. 
Food Sec. 22, 1–12 (2019).
 13. Azad, M., Crawford, E. E. & Kaila, H. K. Conflict and Violence in Nigeria: 
Results from the North East, North Central, and South South Zones (World 
Bank, 2018).
 14. Young, H., Jaspers, S., Brown, R., Frize, J. & Khogali, H. Food-Security 
Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods Approach (Overseas Development 
Institute, 2001).
 15. Technical Manual Version 3.0: Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security 
and Nutrition Decisions (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Global 
Partners, 2019).
 16. de Perez, E. C. et al. From rain to famine: assessing the utility of rainfall 
observations and seasonal forecasts to anticipate food insecurity in East 
Africa. Food Sec. 11, 57–68 (2019).
 17. Verpoorten, M. Household coping in war- and peacetime: cattle sales in 
Rwanda, 1991–2001. J. Dev. Econ. 88, 67–86 (2009).
 18. Helman, D., Zaitchik, B. F. & Funk, C. Climate has contrasting direct and 
indirect effects on armed conflicts. Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 104017 (2020).
 19. Buhaug, H., Benjaminsen, T. A., Sjaastad, E. & Theisen, O. M. Climate 
variability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Environ. Res. Lett. 10, 125015 (2015).
 20. Von Uexkull, N. Sustained drought, vulnerability and civil conflict in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Polit. Geogr. 43, 16–26 (2014).
 21. Brück, T. & d’Errico, M. Food security and violent conflict: introduction to 
the special issue. World Dev.117, 167–171 (2019).
 22. Martin-Shields, C. P. & Stojetz, W. Food security and conflict: empirical 
challenges and future opportunities for research and policy making on food 
security and conflict. World Dev. 119, 150–164 (2019).
 23. Justino, P. Nutrition, Governance and Violence: A Framework for the Analysis 
of Resilience and Vulnerability to Food Insecurity in Contexts of Violent 
Conflict HiCN Working Paper 132 (Institute of Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex, 2012).
 24. Arias, M. A., Ibáñez, A. M. & Zambrano, A. Agricultural production amid 
conflict: separating the effects of conflict into shocks and uncertainty. World 
Dev. 119, 165–184 (2019).
 25. Federal Republic of Somalia Systematic Country Diagnostic (World Bank, 
2018).
NATuRE FooD | www.nature.com/natfood
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved
ArticlesNature Food
 26. Maxwell, D. G. & Majid, N. Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, 
Collective Failures, 2011-12 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2016).
 27. Anderson, W. et al. Towards an integrated soil moisture drought monitor for 
East Africa. Hydrol. Earth Sys. Sci. 16, 2893–2913 (2012).
 28. Funk, C. et al. Examining the role of unusually warm Indo-Pacific sea-surface 
temperatures in recent African droughts. Q. J. R. Meteorol. Soc. 144,  
360–383 (2018).
 29. Sabotage on Nigeria’s Oil-Exporting NCTL Pipeline Caused Significant 
Production Losses (Reuters, 2019).
 30. Trends in Acute Food Insecurity, 2013–2018: Five-year Conflict in South Sudan 
Drives Significant Increase in Assistance Needs and Famine Risk (Famine Early 
Warning System Network, 2018); https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/
special-report/december-2018
 31. Dihel, N. C. & Pape, U. J. South Sudan—Economic Update: Taming the Tides 
of High Inflation-Policy Options (World Bank, 2017).
 32. Anna, C. & Lederer, E. US urges Ethiopia’s PM to allow ‘immediate’ help to 
Tigray. The Washington Post (4 February 2021); https://apnews.com/article/
kenya-ethiopia-united-nations-eritrea-e183d672de7da4c9bf6fae7d24f3a3e0
 33. Osman, A., Olesambu, E. & Balfroid, C. Pastoralism in Africa’s Drylands: 
Reducing Risks, Addressing Vulnerability and Enhancing Resilience (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 2018).
 34. Hein, L., Metzger, M. J. & Leemans, R. The local impacts of climate change in 
the Ferlo, Western Sahel. Clim. Change 93, 465–483 (2009).
 35. Devereux, S. Why does famine persist in Africa? Food Sec. 1, 25–35 (2009).
 36. Integrating Livestock Herd Dynamics into Scenario Development Guidance 
Document 6 (Famine Early Warning System Network, 2018).
 37. Hesse, C. & Cotula, L. Climate Change and Pastoralists: Investing in People to 
Respond to Adversity (IIED, 2006).
 38. Toulmin, C. Livestock Losses and Post-drought Rehabilitation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (ILCA, 1985).
 39. Lesnoff, M., Corniaux, C. & Hiernaux, P. Sensitivity analysis of the recovery 
dynamics of a cattle population following drought in the Sahel region. Ecol. 
Modell. 232, 28–39 (2012).
 40. White, C. Herd reconstitution: the role of credit among Wodaabe herders in 
Central Niger. Camb. Anthropol. 9, 30–42 (1984).
 41. Ahmed, A. G. M., Azeze, A., Babiker, M. & Tsegaye, D. Post Drought Recovery 
Strategies Among the Pastoral Households in the Horn of Africa: A Review 
(OSSREA, 2002).
 42. Coast, E. Maasai socioeconomic conditions: a cross-border comparison. Hum. 
Ecol. 30, 79–105 (2002).
 43. Raleigh, C. Political marginalization, climate change, and conflict in African 
Sahel states. Int. Stud. Rev. 12, 69–86 (2010).
 44. Smith, K., Barrett, C. B. & Box, P. W. Participatory risk mapping for targeting 
research and assistance: with an example from East African pastoralists. 
World Dev. 28, 1945–1959 (2000).
 45. Keen, D. et al. The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and 
Relief in Southwestern Sudan 1983–89 (James Currey, 2008).
 46. Funk, C. Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya face devastating drought. Nature 586, 
645 (2020).
 47. Martens, B. et al. Gleam v3: satellite-based land evaporation and root-zone 
soil moisture. Geosci. Model Dev. 10, 1903–1925 (2017).
 48. Funk, C. et al. The climate hazards infrared precipitation with stations—a 
new environmental record for monitoring extremes. Sci. Data 2,  
150066 (2015).
 49. Didan, K. Mod13q1 MODIS/TERRA Vegetation Indices 16-day l3 Global 250m 
Sin Grid v006. NASA EOSDIS Land Processes DAAC 10 (NASA, 2015).
 50. Young, H. & Jaspars, S. Review of Nutrition and Mortality Indicators for the 
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC): Reference Levels and 
Decision-Making (Inter-Agency Standing Committee Nutrition Cluster and 
ECHO, 2009).
 51. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification: Technical Manual Version 2.0: 
Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security Decisions (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 2012).
 52. Raleigh, C., Linke, A., Hegre, H. & Karlsen, J. Introducing ACLED: an armed 
conflict location and event dataset: special data feature. J. Peace Res. 47, 
651–660 (2010).
 53. Tatem, A. J. WorldPop, open data for spatial demography. Sci. Data 4,  
170004 (2017).
 54. Leyk, S. et al. The spatial allocation of population: a review of large-scale 
gridded population data products and their fitness for use. Earth Syst. Sci. 
Data 11, 1385–1409 (2019).
Acknowledgements
This project was supported by ACToday, a Columbia World Project. W.A. acknowledges 
funding from the Earth Institute Postdoctoral Fellow Program. R.S., S.M., E.I.-N., W.S., 
A.d.S. and F.C. were supported by NSF award OIA 1934798.
Author contributions
W.A. designed the experiments. W.A., C.T., S.M., E.I.-N., R.S., W.S., F.C. and A.d.S. 
analysed the data and wrote the paper. W.A., C.T., S.M., W.S., D.M. and K.M. contributed 
analysis tools and materials to the research.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Additional information
Supplementary information The online version contains supplementary material 
available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-021-00327-4.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to W.A.
Peer review information Nature Food thanks Chris Funk and the other, anonymous, 
reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.
Reprints and permissions information is available at www.nature.com/reprints.
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in 
published maps and institutional affiliations.
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2021
NATuRE FooD | www.nature.com/natfood
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved









Springer Nature journal content, brought to you courtesy of Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH (“Springer Nature”). 
Springer Nature supports a reasonable amount of sharing of  research papers by authors, subscribers and authorised users (“Users”), for small-
scale personal, non-commercial use provided that all copyright, trade and service marks and other proprietary notices are maintained. By
accessing, sharing, receiving or otherwise using the Springer Nature journal content you agree to these terms of use (“Terms”). For these
purposes, Springer Nature considers academic use (by researchers and students) to be non-commercial. 
These Terms are supplementary and will apply in addition to any applicable website terms and conditions, a relevant site licence or a personal
subscription. These Terms will prevail over any conflict or ambiguity with regards to the relevant terms, a site licence or a personal subscription
(to the extent of the conflict or ambiguity only). For Creative Commons-licensed articles, the terms of the Creative Commons license used will
apply. 
We collect and use personal data to provide access to the Springer Nature journal content. We may also use these personal data internally within
ResearchGate and Springer Nature and as agreed share it, in an anonymised way, for purposes of tracking, analysis and reporting. We will not
otherwise disclose your personal data outside the ResearchGate or the Springer Nature group of companies unless we have your permission as
detailed in the Privacy Policy. 
While Users may use the Springer Nature journal content for small scale, personal non-commercial use, it is important to note that Users may
not: 
 
use such content for the purpose of providing other users with access on a regular or large scale basis or as a means to circumvent access
control;
use such content where to do so would be considered a criminal or statutory offence in any jurisdiction, or gives rise to civil liability, or is
otherwise unlawful;
falsely or misleadingly imply or suggest endorsement, approval , sponsorship, or association unless explicitly agreed to by Springer Nature in
writing;
use bots or other automated methods to access the content or redirect messages
override any security feature or exclusionary protocol; or
share the content in order to create substitute for Springer Nature products or services or a systematic database of Springer Nature journal
content.
 
In line with the restriction against commercial use, Springer Nature does not permit the creation of a product or service that creates revenue,
royalties, rent or income from our content or its inclusion as part of a paid for service or for other commercial gain. Springer Nature journal
content cannot be used for inter-library loans and librarians may not upload Springer Nature journal content on a large scale into their, or any
other, institutional repository. 
These terms of use are reviewed regularly and may be amended at any time. Springer Nature is not obligated to publish any information or
content on this website and may remove it or features or functionality at our sole discretion, at any time with or without notice. Springer Nature
may revoke this licence to you at any time and remove access to any copies of the Springer Nature journal content which have been saved. 
To the fullest extent permitted by law, Springer Nature makes no warranties, representations or guarantees to Users, either express or implied
with respect to the Springer nature journal content and all parties disclaim and waive any implied warranties or warranties imposed by law,
including merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose. 
Please note that these rights do not automatically extend to content, data or other material published by Springer Nature that may be licensed
from third parties. 
If you would like to use or distribute our Springer Nature journal content to a wider audience or on a regular basis or in any other manner not
expressly permitted by these Terms, please contact Springer Nature at 
 
onlineservice@springernature.com
 
